PROTECTION

Battleships must be able to withstand repeated hits and continue fighting, so their armour expanse, distribution, and thickness are extremely important. In terms of expanse, the Bismarck devoted 19,082 mt to belt, deck, turret, underwater, and splinter armour, which amounted to 40% of its designed combat weight (47,870 mt). Only the 69,100 mt Japanese battleships of the Yamato class carried more armour (22,895 mt), ablet at a much smaller percentage (33.2%) of the ship's total weight.
Materials used.
The steels used to build the Bismarck were the end result of extensive research and development that began shortly after WWI ended. This led to the creation of armour and construction steel that was clearly superior to WWI products. In terms of specifics, the following criteria apply:
 · St 52. Construction grade steel with a tensile strength of 52-64 kg/mm², a strain of 21% and a yield point of 36-38 kg/mm².
 · KC n/A (Krupp cementite, new type). Face-hardened armour steel. This material contained 3.5-3.8% nickel, 2% chrome, 0.3% carbon, 0.3% manganese, and 0.2% molybdenum, and it was used for the side belt, turrets, barbettes, and conning towers. The 670 Brinell face-layer tapered in hardness as it extended into 40-50% of the plate's total thickness. Post WWII proving ground test indicated that KC was only slightly less resistant than British cemented armour (CA), and markedly superior to US Class A plates.
 · Wh (Wotan hart). Homogeneous armour steel with a tensile strength of 85-95 kg/mm², a strain of 20% and a yield point of 50-55 kg/mm². This material was used for the armoured decks, and, in the thickness employed aboard the Bismarck, was the equal of most foreign homogeneous plates.
 · Ww (Wotan weich). Homogeneous armour steel with a tensile strength of 65-75 kg/mm², a strain of 25% and a yield point of 38-40 kg/mm². This material was used for the longitudinal torpedo bulkheads.
Vertical Protection.

Kiel, March 1941. The 32cm lower main belt which covered 70% of the ship's waterline length, can be clearly seen here.

The external armoured citadel included a main KC vertical belt that was 320 mm thick, 4.8 meters wide, and 170.7 meters long. It covered 70% of the waterline (by far the greatest extent of any WWII battleship), and protected the armour deck, the upper platform deck, and part of the middle platform deck. The belt was backed with a 60 mm thick layer of teakwood that helped absorb shock damage, and it was bolted onto 16-25 mm thick side plating. The majority of the belt was located above the waterline (3.0/1.8 meters as designed, but 2.6/2.2 meters in practice), with the reasoning that shells are more likely to hit above than below the waterline. The citadel area above the main belt was armoured with 145 mm thick KC plates that protected the battery deck all the way to the armoured upper deck. This plating could also provide a protected waterplane area in the event of severe lists, decap and slow heavy APC shells, and stop light shells outright. Finally, lighter plating was mounted well forward and aft of the main belt (60 mm Wh forward and 80 mm Wh aft), and this protected nearly the entire waterplane area from splinter of light shell damage.
The belt armour was also inclined outward to increase its resistance in regions forward, abeam, and aft of the main turrets and their magazines, with the cambered sections occupying around 50% of the main belt's length. The outboard inclination was 17°, 10°, 7°, and 8-10° abreast turrets Anton, Bruno, Dora, and Cäsar respectively. This accorded additional protection while not compromising stability by compressing the bulk of the waterplane area inboard, and especially in the critical amidships area.
The hull was divided into transverse sections by 22 bulkheads that varied in thickness. The KC armoured bulkhead between sections XIX and XX (frame 202.7) was located in front of turret "Anton", and it marked the citadel's forward limit. This bulkhead extended from the upper deck down to the middle platform deck, and varied in thickness as it descended (145 mm at the level of the battery and armour decks, 220 mm thick at the upper platform deck, and 180 mm at the middle platform deck). It was partially shielded by the ship's 60 mm forward plating, which presented very poor attack angles to shells being fired from the bow quarters. Aft of turret "Dora", between sections II and III (frame 32), there was another armoured transverse bulkhead of similar characteristics, and this was reinforced by the stern's 80 mm thick splinter plating. These two transverse bulkheads, together with the longitudinal side belt and armoured upper deck, defined the external citadel (armour box) which protected the ship outboard areas. The internal raft accorded additional protection to the vitals, as we shall see when examining the horizontal protection scheme.


Horizontal protection.
The upper armour deck was 50-80 mm (Wh) thick and covered most of the ship's length (from frame 10.5 to 224). The 80 mm (Wh) platting was located from forward to aft of each pair of main turrets, around the secondary turrets, and under the control tower. A lightly protected 20 mm (St 52) thick battery deck was located 2.4 meters beneath the upper deck. The third armour deck was 10.3 meters above the keel, and featured the classic "turtle deck" arrangement with sloped edges. The amidships flat portion of the main armour deck marked the top of the internal armoured raft, and it was normally situated about one meter above the designed waterline. It was 80 mm thick over the machinery and 95 mm over the magazines. The outboard sloped portion of this deck was 110-120 mm (Wh) thick, and inclined downward at about 22° from the horizontal to where it met the lower edge of the main armour belt under the waterline. The armour deck's slopes presented attacking shells that penetrated the side armour with impact obliquities of up to 68°, and were 110 mm thick around the machinery and 120 mm thick adjacent to the magazines. Subsequent analysis indicated that the combined external citadel and internal raft could provide the vitals with relative immunity from 406 mm/45 APC shells fired at point-blank range.
The bow region was protected by a 20 mm thick fourth upper platform deck, and the stern had an armoured turtle deck of 110 mm which protected the steering gear.

Horizontal Deck Protection

	Over machinery	Over magazines	Bow	Stern
Upper deck:	50 mm (Wh)	80 mm (Wh)	50 mm (Wh)	50 mm (Wh)
2nd battery deck:	20 mm (St 52)	20 mm (St 52)	12 mm (St 52)	8-12 mm (St 52)
3rd armour deck (centre-slopes):	80-110 mm (Wh)	95-120 mm (Wh)	-	-
4th deck:	-	-	20 mm (Wh)	110 mm (Wh)
Total (centre-slopes):	130-160 mm (Wh)	175-200 mm (Wh)	70 mm (Wh)	160 mm (Wh)

Turrets.
The main battery turrets were 130-360 mm KC. The barbettes were 340 mm KC over the upper deck, and 220 mm KC below it down to the third armour deck. The thickness was reduced because of the protection given by the 80 mm (Wh) upper deck and 145 mm upper citadel plating. In terms of US Class A armour, the effective resistance of the 340 mm barbette armour was 390-405 mm.

The secondary battery turrets were protected by 20-100 mm Wh plates. Their barbettes were 80 mm Wh above the upper deck. Below the upper deck the barbettes' armour could be reduced to 20 mm because the 80 mm Wh thickness of the upper deck and the 145 mm thickness of the citadel armour provided additional protection. Moreover, the secondary turrets' ammunition trunks were protected by the main side belt as they descended, and thus there was no need to extend their heavy barbette armour downward.

Command posts. Conning towers.
The forward conning tower had 350 mm KC walls and a 220 mm KC roof. The rangefinder cupola, on top of the conning tower, had 200 mm KC walls and a 100 mm KC roof. The conning tower was connected with the armour deck by a communications shaft of 85 cm in diameter and 220 mm KC walls.
The after conning tower was not so heavily protected. Its sides were 150 mm KC, the roof was 50 mm KC, and the communications shaft running to the lower decks was 70 cm in diameter and 50 mm KC thick. The aft range finder cupola had 100 mm KC walls, and a roof of 50 mm KC.
The foretop command post was lightly protected because it was so high in the foremast that heavy armour would cause stability problems. The walls were 60 mm KC and the roof was 20 mm KC. The cupola's walls were 30 mm KC, and the roof was 20 mm KC.

Command post Forward After Foretop Walls 350 mm 150 mm 60 mm Roof 220 mm 50 mm 20 mm Floor 70 mm 30 mm 20 mm Left photo: The forward conning tower as seen from the searchlight platform. Its walls were 350 mm thick and the roof 220 mm. The range finder cupola has not yet been installed.

Underwater protection and compartmentation.
The hull was divided into 22 watertight compartments, 17 of which were located within the citadel (sections III-XIX). The area above the waterline between the armour and upper deck was divided into three large sections by 30 mm (Wh) thick port and starboard longitudinal splinter bulkheads. These were located 3-5.4 meters inboard of the side belt, and formed 51 armoured cells within the upper citadel by being transepted by transverse bulkheads. This entire array was divided in the horizontal plane by the intervening battery deck, which resulted in 102 cells. Many of these cells were subdivided by transverse and longitudinal bulkheads, with the compartmentation between the main and battery deck being in the region of 100, and above that number if one includes the compartments fore and aft of the citadel. However, the compartmentation above the armour deck far exceeds that below it.
The underwater hull formed the vast bulk of the internal armoured raft, and it was protected from torpedo and mine damage by 45 mm Ww port and starboard longitudinal bulkheads. These bulkheads were vertical instead of sloped as in the Scharnhorst Class, and could interact with the sloped armour deck above them to increase the vitals' protection against shells, although their main purpose was to limit underwater damage.
The distance between the torpedo bulkhead and the outer hull was 5.4 meters amidships (sections IX-XII), although it tapered to about 3 meters abeam turrets Anton (section XVIII) and Dora (section IV). German design philosophy attempted to avoid overly wide torpedo protection systems on the grounds that they placed a great burden on stability when flooded. Indeed, the effects of outboard flooding increase as a function of the square of a given water mass's distance from the centreline. A traditional gas expansion/counterflooding space was placed outboard of three liquid-loaded compartments which abutted the main torpedo bulkhead. The fuel oil and feed water these compartments contained, helped slow fragments as well as disperse and absorb the shock waves generated by underwater blasts. The outer void was used for counterflooding. Overall, the torpedo defence system was designed to resist a TNT charge of 250 kg (550 lbs) although its resistance actually proved to be considerably higher than that.¹⁾
The compartmentation within each level of the internal raft was very extensive. There were 3-4 decks above the compartmented double bottom, and each of these was intricately subdivided. For example, the upper platform deck included over 250 compartments, while the middle platform deck had a nearly equal number. The lower platform deck was subdivided into over 200 compartments, and the fuel, potable water, and void spaces below this were even more finely divided. In fact, the double bottom had a depth of 1.7 meters between frames 77.3-154.6, and this provided some protection against underwater explosions from mines.
Finally, the hull was equipped with the MES (Magnetischer Eigenschutz) "magnetic self-protection system". This consisted of a series of cables that demagnetised the ship's hull in defence against magnetic mines and torpedoes.

	Distance between torpedo bulkhead and outer hull	Torpedo bulkhead
Turret A (section XVIII)	3 meters	45 mm (Ww)
Turret B (section XVI)	3.5 meters	45 mm (Ww)
Amidships (sections IX-XIII)	5.4 meters	45 mm (Ww)
Turret C (section VI)	3.8 meters	45 mm (Ww)
Turret D (section IV)	3 meters	45 mm (Ww)

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1) According to “Technical Report No. 222-45. Loss of the Battleship Tirpitz on 12 November 1944”, the torpedo defence system onTirpitz was designed to withstand about 660 pounds (300 kg) of German hexanite.

WEIGHTS

SI Ship’s construction workshop: SII Mechanic’s workshop: SIII Carpenter's workshop: SIV Painter’s workshop: Ship's body (SI-SIV): SI Armour plating (decks, inner bulkheads, etc):          9,165 mt SI Hull side armour:                                                    5,149 mt SI Bulkhead armour (at frames 10.5, 32, and 202.7):     372 mt SI Barbette armour (4 x 38cm + 6 x 15cm):                 2,306 mt SI Conning towers armour:                                   +       492 mt

10,505 mt         975 mt         242 mt   +    180 mt    11,902 mt

Total armor plating (without turret armour):MI Main Machinery (without fluids, oil, and water): MII Auxiliary Machinery (without fluids, oil, and water): Wa Artillery (Main & secondary turrets, AA mounts, rangefinders, etc.): Wa Turret armour: Aircraft installation, catapult (without planes): Mining weapons: Empty ship (Schiff Fertig Leer):Fluids, oil, and water for MI Main machinery: Fluids, oil, and water for MII Auxiliary machinery: SII fluids: Equipment (crew, provisions, nautical instruments, etc): Ammunition: Artillery equipment: MI Main machinery equipment: Ammunition and equipment for mining weapons: Aircraft, equipment and tools: Type Displacement (Typverdrängung):Drinking water (1.0): Washing water (1.0) (without reserve): Standard Displacement:1)Furnace fuel oil (0.953) (without reserve): Propulsion fuel oil (0.852): Lubricating oil (0.92): Aviation gasoline: Boiler feedwater (0.9989): Ship fully equipped:Reserve fuel oil and washing water: Maximum Displacement:

17,484 mt     3,085 mt      1,360 mt      4,744 mt      1,598 mt          72 mt   +    4.5 mt    40,250 mt        260 mt          62 mt          33 mt      1,023 mt      1,490 mt          97 mt          77 mt           6 mt   +     15 mt    43,313 mt        155 mt   +    510 mt    43,978 mt     6,194 mt         527 mt         275 mt          34 mt   +    752 mt    51,760 mt +  1,726 mt    53,486 mt

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1) The standard displacement of a warship was defined in the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 as the displacement of the ship complete, fully manned, engined, and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel or reserve feed water on board.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Battleship Bismarck

Laid down:	1 July 1936
Launched:	14 February 1939
Commissioned:	24 August 1940
Construction cost:	RM. 196.8 million
Displacement:  ·  Empty ship:  ·  Standard:  ·  Construction:  ·  Full load:  ·  Maximum:	40,250 metric tons 43,978 metric tons 47,870 metric tons 51,760 metric tons 53,486 metric tons
Dimensions:  ·  Waterline length:  ·  Overall length:  ·  Beam:  ·  Standard draught:  ·  Maximum draught:  ·  Freeboard amidships:  ·  Height of hull sides (depth):  ·  Waterplane area:	241.55 meters 251 meters 36 meters 9.33 meters 10.55 meters between 4.45 - 5.67 meters 15 meters 5,740 m²
Armour Protection:  ·  Upper belt:  ·  Main belt:  ·  Main battery turrets:  ·  Secondary battery turrets:  ·  Upper deck:  ·  Third armour deck:  ·  Conning tower:  ·  Torpedo bulkhead:  ·  Protected length 1):  ·  PC/TC 2):  ·  Armour's weight:	145 mm 320 mm 130-360 mm 40-100 mm 50-80 mm 80-120 mm 220-350 mm 45 mm 70% (170.7 meters) 17/22 19,082 metric tons
Armament:  ·  Main:  ·  Secondary:  ·  Anti-aircraft:	8 x 38cm/L52 12 x 15cm/L55 16 x 10.5cm/L65 16 x 3.7cm/L83 18 x 2cm/L65
Fire control:	5 x 10.5-m base rangefinders 1 x 7-m base rangefinder 2 x 6.5-m base rangefinders 4 x 4-m Type SL-8 rangefinders 2 x 3-m rangefinders
Radar Equipment:	3 x FuMO 23
Propulsion plant:	12 Wagner boilers Three Blohm & Voss turbine sets 150,170 hp (maximum obtained)
Speed:	30.12 knots (maximum obtained)
Endurance:	9,280 nautical miles at 16 knots 8,900 nautical miles at 17 knots 8,525 nautical miles at 19 knots 6,640 nautical miles at 24 knots 4,500 nautical miles at 28 knots
Fuel oil capacity:	7,400 metric tons
Aircraft:	4 x Arado Ar 196
Crew:	2,200+
Hull coefficients & ratios: · Ratio length/beam: · Ratio beam/draught: · Ratio draught/depth: · Ratio length/depth: · Block coefficient:3) · Midship coefficient:4) · Waterplane coefficient:5) · Prismatic coefficient:6) · Metacentric height (GM):	6.71 3.85 0.62 16.10 0.55 0.97 0.66 0.56 4.00 meters

1) Protected length: Part of the ship within the citadel with the maximum amount of armour and underwater protection.
2) PC/TC: Protected compartments / Total compartments. The protected compartments are those within the citadel.
3) The block coefficient (CB) is the ratio of the underwater hull volume of a ship at a particular draft to the volume of a rectangular prism (the circumscribing prism) of the same length, breadth, and draught as the ship. CB = V/(L x B x T)
Bismarck block coefficient is calculated as follows: CB = 45,000 mt / (241.55 m x 36 m x 9.3 m) = 0.55
4) The midship section coefficient (CM) is the ratio of the area of the underwater midship section (Am) of a ship at a particular draft to the area of a rectangle (the circumscribing rectangle) of the same breadth and draught as the ship. CM = Am/(B x T)
Bismarck midship section coefficient is calculated as follows: CM = 305 m² / (36 m x 8.7 m) = 0.97
5) The waterplane coefficient (CWP) is the ratio of the area of a ship’s waterplane (AWP) to the area of a rectangle (the circumscribing rectangle) of the same length and breadth as the ship. CWP = AWP/(L x B)
Bismarck waterplane coefficient is calculated as follows: CWP = 5,740 m² / (241.55 m x 36 m) = 0.66
6) The longitudinal prismatic coefficient (CP) is the ratio of the underwater hull volume of a ship to the volume of a prism with length equal to the ship’s and cross-section area identical to the midship section. In other words, the prismatic coefficient is equal to the block coefficient (CB) divided by the midship section coefficient (CM). CP = V/(Am x L) = CB/CM
Bismarck prismatic coefficient is calculated as follows: CP = 0.55 / 0.97 = 0.56
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Characteristics of the Bismarck and other British capital ships in May 1941.

Ship:	Bismarck	Hood	King George V	Rodney
Laid down:	1 July 1936	1 September 1916	1 January 1937	28 December 1922
Launched:	14 February 1939	22 August 1918	21 February 1939	17 December 1925
Commissioned:	24 August 1940	29 March 1920	11 December 1940	November 1927
Displacement: - Standard: - Full load:	43,900 mt 51,700 mt	43,144 mt 49,136 mt	38,600 mt 44,400 mt	33,700 mt 41,000 mt
Dimensions: - Length overall: - Beam: - Maximum draft:	251 m 36 m 10.55 m	262.2 m 32.2 m 10.1 m	227.1 m 31.9 m 10.3 m	216.4 m 32.31 m 12.2 m
Armour: - Main belt: - Turrets: - Upper deck: - Armour deck: - Protected length: - PC/TC: - Armour's weight:	320 mm 130-360 mm 50-80 mm 80-120 mm 70 % 17/22 19,082 mt	305 mm 127-381 mm 32 mm 51 mm 65 % 12/19 13,650 mt	348-374 mm 150-324 mm - 124-150 mm 59 % 10/21 12,612 mt	356 mm 184-406 mm - 159 mm 53 % 9/17? 14,250 mt
Armament: - Main: - Secondary: - Anti-aircraft:	8 x 380 mm L/52 12 x 150 mm L/55 16 x 105 mm 16 x 37 mm 18 x 20 mm	8 x 381 mm L/42 - 14 x 102 mm 24 x 40 mm 16 x 12.7 mm 5 x 20 rockets	10 x 356 mm L/45 16 x 133 mm L/50 32 x 40 mm 4 x 20 rockets	9 x 406 mm L/45 12 x 152 mm L/50 6 x 120 mm 24 x 40 mm
Radar:	3 x FuMO 23	1 x Type 284 1 x Type 279M	1 x Type 284 1 x Type 281	1 x Type 279 ?
Aircraft:	4 x Arado Ar 196	-	4 x Walrus	1 x Walrus
Machinery:	12 boilers 3 sets of turbines 150,170 hp	24 boilers 4 sets of turbines 151,280 hp	8 boilers 4 sets of turbines 113,000 hp	8 boilers 2 sets of turbines 45,000 hp
Speed:	30 knots	29-30 knots	28-29 knots	21 knots
Endurance:	8,525 nm at 19 knots	5,950 nm at 18 knots	4,750 nm at 18 knots	7,000 nm at 16 knots
Fuel capacity:	7,400 mt	4,064 mt	4,000 mt	3,805 mt
Crew:	2,200+	1,417	1,600	1,300

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Characteristics of the Bismarck and other battleships of the time in 1941.

Ship:	Bismarck	Richelieu	Vittorio Veneto	North Carolina
Laid down:	1 July 1936	22 October 1935	28 October 1934	27 October 1937
Launched:	14 February1939	17 January 1939	25 July 1937	13 June 1940
Commissioned:	24 August 1940	15 June 1940	1 May 1940	9 April 1941
Displacement: - Standard: - Full load:	43,900 mt 51,700 mt	38,450 mt 45,438 mt	41,167 mt 45,752 mt	37,178 mt 45,519 mt
Dimensions: - Length overall: - Beam: - Maximum draft:	251 m 36 m 10.55 m	247.8 m 33.08 m 9.9 m	237.8 m 32.95 m 10.44 m	222.1 m 33 m 10.8 m
Armour: - Main Belt: - Turrets: - Upper deck: - Armour deck: - Protected length: - PC/TC: - Armour's weight:	320 mm 130-360 mm 50-80 mm 80-120 mm 70 % 17/22 19,082 mt	327 mm 170-430 mm 24 mm 150-170 + 40 mm 54 % 10/21 16,400 mt	350 mm 130-380 mm 45 mm 112 mm 55 % 8/18 13,545 mt	305 mm 178-406 mm 37 mm 104 + 36 mm 60 % 9/18? 15,087 mt
Armament: - Main: - Secondary: - Anti-aircraft:	8 x 380 mm L/52 12 x 150 mm L/55 16 x 105 mm 16 x 37 mm 18 x 20 mm	8 x 380 mm L/45 9 x 152 mm L/55 12 x 100 mm 12 x 37 mm 32 x 13.2 mm	9 x 381 mm L/50 12 x 152 mm L/55 12 x 90 mm 20 x 37 mm 20 x 20 mm	9 x 406 mm L/45 - 20 x 127 mm L/38 16 x 28 mm 12 x 12.7 mm
Aircraft:	4 x Arado Ar 196	3 x Loire 130	2-3 Romeo Ro 43	2 x Kingfisher
Machinery:	12 boilers 3 sets of turbines 150,170 hp	6 boilers 4 sets of turbines 179,000 hp	8 boilers 4 sets of turbines 140,000 hp	8 boilers 4 sets of turbines 122,000 hp
Speed:	30 knots	32.6 knots	30 knots	28 knots
Endurance:	8,525 nm at 19 knots	9,500 nm at 15 knots	4,584 nm at 16 knots	17,450 nm at 15 knots
Fuel capacity:	7,400 mt	6,000 mt	4,000 mt	6,300 mt
Crew:	2,200+	approx 1,600	1,920	2,300

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Characteristics of Bismarck's sister ship and the last generation of battleships.

Ship:	Tirpitz (1944)	Yamato	Iowa	Vanguard
Laid down:	2 November 1936	4 November 1937	27 June 1940	2 October 1941
Launched:	1 April 1939	8 August 1940	27 August 1942	30 November 1944
Commissioned:	25 February 1941	16 December 1941	23 February 1943	9 August 1946
Displacement: - Standard: - Full load:	43,900 mt 51,700 mt	64,000 mt 72,800 mt	48,110 mt 57,500 mt	46,200 mt 51,400 mt
Dimensions: - Length overall: - Beam: - Maximum draft:	253.6 m 36 m 10.61 m	263 m 37 m 10.86 m	270.4 m 32.9 m 11.3 m	249 m 32.8 m 10.5 m
Armour: - Main Belt: - Turrets: - Upper deck: - Armour deck: - Protected length: - PC/TC: - Armour's weight:	315 mm 130-360 mm 50-80 mm 80-120 mm 70 % 17/22 19,082 mt	410 mm 270-650 mm - 200-230 mm 60 % ? 21,200 mt	307 mm 185-432 mm 38 mm 121 + 32 mm 60 % ? 18,700 mt	330-355 mm 152-330 mm - 127-152 mm 58 % ? ? mt
Armament: - Main: - Secondary: - Anti-aircraft:	8 x 380 mm L/52 12 x 150 mm L/55 16 x 105 mm 16 x 37 mm 78 x 20 mm	9 x 459 mm L/45 12 x 155 mm L/60 12 x 127 mm 24 x 25 mm 4 x 13.2 mm	9 x 406 mm L/50 20 x 127 mm L/38 80 x 40 mm 49 x 20 mm -	8 x 381 mm L/42 16 x 133 mm L/50 73 x 40 mm - -
Aircraft:	4 x Arado Ar 196	7 x Mitsubishi F1M	2-3 Kingfisher	-
Machinery:	12 boilers 3 sets of turbines 163,024 hp	12 boilers 4 sets of turbines 153,000 hp	8 boilers 4 sets of turbines 212,000 hp	8 boilers 4 sets of turbines 130,000 hp
Speed:	30.8 knots	27-8 knots	33 knots	30 knots
Endurance:	8,870 nm at 19 knots	7,200 nm at 16 knots	18,000 nm at 12 knots	9,000 nm at 20 knots
Fuel capacity:	7,780 mt	6,300 mt	7,600 mt	7,000 mt
Crew:	2,600	3,300	2,700	2,000+

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mt = metric tons, 1 mt = 1,000 kilograms
nm = nautical miles, 1 nm = 1,852 meters = 2,025 yards

1 knot = 1 nm/hour


source : http://www.kbismarck.com/

SAM - the CAT :)

The black and white cat was named Oscar and then became known as Unsinkable Sam started his “career” in the fleet of the Nazi regime, the Kriegsmarine, and ended it in the Royal Navy. He was onboard Bismarck, the HMS Cossack and the HMS Ark Royal, but here comes the cool part: the other thing that all those ships have in common is that they all three sank, and Sam survived them all.

Bismarck sinking

Bismarck. Image via Wikipedia.

Bismarck was the first of two Bismarck-class battleships built for Nazi Germany’s Kriegsmarine. Named after Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, the battleship was launched on 14 February 1939, measured 241 meters in length and weighed 41,700 tons. Bismarck was involved in a battle with The Prince of Wales, an allied battleship, was badly damaged, and became unmanoeuvrable.

Ultimately, the ship was sank, and only 118 from its crew of over 2,200 survived. Hours later, Oskar was found floating on a board and picked from the water, the only survivor to be rescued by the homeward-bound British destroyer HMS Cossack. The crew didn’t know the cat’s name and they named him Oscar. It was then that Unsinkable Sam switched sides from the Nazi to the Allied forces, but his luck didn’t change so much…

HMS Cossack sinking…

HMS Cossack

The cat served on board Cossack for the next few months as the ship carried out convoy escort duties in the Mediterranean and north Atlantic. Things went pretty smoothly for that period, but ultimately, the destroyer was badly damaged by a torpedo, and 139 of its crew were killed.

On 27 October 1941, a day after the tow was slipped, Cossack sank to the west of Gibraltar, and Oscar was found clinging to a piece of plank; he made it and was brought to the shore establishment in Gibraltar. When they learned what happened, British officers changed his name to Unsinkable Sam – a fitting name for a cat that survived the sinking of two warships. But his adventure wasn’t over quite yet…

…and HMS Ark Royal sinking…

Unsinkable Sam was then adopted by the crew of the HMS Ark Royal – ironically, a ship that was instrumental in sinking the Bismarck. Ark Royal survived several near misses and gained a reputation as a ‘lucky ship’. The Germans incorrectly reported her as sunk on multiple occasions – the right place for Sam to be. But luck didn’t last, and when returning from Malta on 14 November 1941, this ship too was torpedoed, this time by an U-boat.

This time, Sam was found clinging to a floating plank by a motor launch, and described as “angry but quite unharmed”. But by this time, Sam had enough. He was transferred to a job on land and spent his days hunting mice in the building of the Governor General in Gibraltar. Eventually, he was sent back to the UK where he remained at a ‘Home for Sailors’ in Belfast until the end of his earthly days.

Unsinkable Legacy

Painting of Unsinkable Sam.

Some people question the veridicity of Sam’s story, classing it as a ‘sea story’. Surviving the Bismarck sinking seems especially unlikely, as salvaging the crew was done in desperate conditions, but even so, I could imagine a British soldier taking the time to save the cat.

I don’t know if the story is true or not, but we’ll just take it as it is for now. Take it as a story, take it as a legend or a myth – Unsinkable Sam survived the destruction of three warship in World War II and lived happily until 1955. A pastel portrait of Sam (titled “Oscar, the Bismarck’s Cat”) by the artist Georgina Shaw-Baker is in the possession of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich. Oh, and as for Sam’s legacy – it goes to show that even in the most dire of circumstances, even as everything around you is crumbling down, you can still cling on to a piece of wood, get rescued, and move on to another ship and start over again. Or it goes to show that cats really do have 9 lives.

THE SHIPS INVOLVED

During the course of Operation Rheinübung almost 100 ships of all kinds were deployed to operate with, against or because of the Bismarck. The following table lists all the ships that had something to do with it, and got involved in one or another way.

	Battleships	Carriers	Heavy Cruisers	Light Cruisers	Destroyers	Submarines	Others
German	Bismarck	-	Prinz Eugen	-	Z-23 Z-16 Friedrich Eckoldt Z-10 Hans Lody	U-93, U-43 U-46, U-557 U-66, U-94 U-556, U-108 U-98, U-48 U-74, U-552	Sachsenwald
British	King George V Prince of Wales Ramillies Revenge Rodney Repulse Hood Renown	Victorious Ark Royal	Suffolk Norfolk Dorsetshire London	Kenya Galatea Aurora Neptune Hermione Edinburgh Manchester Arethusa Birmingham Sheffield	Achates, Antelope Anthony, Echo Somali, Eskimo Nestor, Jupiter Electra, Icarus Active, Inglefield Intrepid, Assiniboine Saguenay, Lance Legion, Columbia Punjabi, Winsor Mashona, Cossack Sikh, Zulu, Maori Piorun (Polish), Tartar Faulknor, Foresight Forester, Foxhound, Fury, Hesperus	H-44 Minerve P-31 Sealion Seawolf Tigris Sturgeon Pandora	-
Swedish	-	-	-	Gotland	-	-	-
Spanish	-	-	Canarias	-	-	-	-
American	-	-	-	-	-	-	Modoc

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LINE DRAWINGS (Drawings made by Manuel P. González López) All the ship drawings on this page are displayed in the same scale in order to facilitate comparisons among them. Click on to see enlarged versions.

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source : http://www.kbismarck.com/

THE LAST STAND OF THE BISMARCK

By José M. Rico The Final Battle (A desperate fight against impossible odds).
The sea ran high with the wind from the north-west at force 8 (34-40 knots). On board the Bismarck, the atmosphere on the bridge was tense, and they knew it was only a matter of time before the British engaged them with heavy ships. The German battleship was steering against the wind at seven knots. The flooding in the stern compartments had somehow reduced the bow trim although the ship had a slight list to port. At 0833, King George V and Rodney altered their course to 110º, and ten minutes later at 0843, they sighted theBismarck at 23,000 meters (25,150 yards).

Balance of Forces

Ship:	Bismarck	Rodney	King George V	Norfolk	Dorsetshire
Displacement:	51,700 mt	41,000 mt	44,400 mt	13,400 mt	13,400 mt
Armament:  ·  Main:  ·  Secondary:	8 x 38 cm 12 x 15 cm	9 x 40.6 cm 12 x 15.2 cm	10 x 35.6 cm 16 x 13.3 cm	8 x 20.3 cm -	8 x 20.3 cm -
Armour:  ·  Belt:  ·  Turrets:  ·  Upper deck:  ·  Armour deck:	320 mm 130-360 mm 50-80 mm 80-120 mm	356 mm 184-406 mm - 159 mm	348-374 mm 150-324 mm - 124-150 mm	25-50 mm 25 mm - 35 mm	25-50 mm 25 mm - 35 mm
Speed:	30 knots*	21 knots	28 knots	32 knots	32 knots

* Bismarck's speed is irrelevant in this case as she was only doing seven knots during the final battle.
The Rodney opened fire at 0847, followed by the King George V one minute later. The distance at this time was about 20,000 meters (21,870 yards). The Bismarck returned fire at 0849 with the forward turrets "Anton" and "Bruno" against the Rodney. Turrets “Caesar” and “Dora” could not be trained at this time. On the contrary, the Rodney had all her nine guns positioned forward and the King George V added six more. So, the initial stage of this engagement consisted of an exchange between four German guns and fifteen British. TheBismarck was totally outgunned. Moreover, at 0854, the Norfolk joined the battle with her eight 20.3 cm guns, and at 0858 the secondary battery of Rodney joined the action. Nevertheless, just at this time the Bismarckmanaged to straddle Rodney.

Bismarck's final battle has just begun and the first British shells fall near the German battleship on the morning of 27 May 1941.

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Finally, at 0902, the Bismarck was hit by several shells that struck the forecastle, foremast and disabled the foretop rangefinder. At 0904, the Dorsetshire (Captain Benjamin C. S. Martin) which had just arrived, also opened fire. Two battleships and two heavy cruisers were firing against the Bismarck. At 0908, the forward range finder and turrets "Anton" and "Bruno" were put out of action. Bismarck's fire control was, therefore, shifted to the after command post. From there, the Fourth Artillery Officer (IV.A.O.), Lieutenant Müllenheim-Rechberg directed four salvoes against the King George V. But at about 0913, just as he got the range, his station was also put out of action by a 35.6 cm shell that destroyed the cupola. The after turrets then proceeded to fire under local control at Rodney which, in the meantime, had launched six torpedoes atBismarck, none of them hit. At 0921, turret "Dora" was put out of action after one of its own shells exploded inside the right barrel. At 0927, turret "Anton" or "Bruno" surprisingly fired one last salvo. Four minutes later, at 0931 turret "Cäsar" fired its last salvo. Only a few secondary guns were still in action, but these were soon to be silenced, too, by the enormous avalanche of British fire. At this time, Captain Lindemann, gave the order to scuttle and abandon ship.
Once the Bismarck lost her fighting capability, Rodney got closer, and from distances between 2,500 and 4,000 meters continued firing with her nine 40.6 cm guns against both sides of the German battleship. The hits continued. At about 0940, the rear wall of turret "Bruno" blew out and the turret caught on fire. At 0956, the Rodney launched two more torpedoes from 2,700 meters with one possible hit scored on the portside. From this point blank range it was virtually impossible to miss a shot, and shell by shell hit the Bismarckwhich amazingly was still afloat. Soon after 1000, the Norfolk launched four torpedoes from about 3,600 meters with one possible hit to the starboard side. The destruction aboard the Bismarck was complete, and men had begun jumping overboard. All guns were out of action, their barrels pointing in different directions at odd angles. The funnel and superstructure were holed in many places. The port forward hangar was demolished. In some places the decks looked like a slaughterhouse. Ironically, the main mast was still standing with the battle flag flaying with the wind. The Rodney ceased fire at 1016, and Tovey, short of fuel, was forced to leave the battlefield.

The battleship Rodney engaging the Bismarck on the morning of 27 May, as seen from the King George V.

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The Sinking of the Bismarck.
At 0920, the Ark Royal had launched twelve Swordfish in order to attack Bismarck. The Swordfish striking force appeared on the scene at about 1015, but due to the heavy fire from the British warships stayed away. At first, the King George V mistook them by German aircraft, and even opened fire with her anti-aircraft battery, but fortunately no planes were hit. At 1020, the Dorsetshire closed the range and fired two 21 inch MK VII torpedoes¹ from 3,000 meters at the starboard side of the Bismarck. Both of them hit, but no appreciable effect was observed. Then, the British heavy cruiser turned around, and at 1036 fired another torpedo from 2,200 meters against Bismarck's port side that also hit. The Swordfish circling over the area were privileged witnesses to this unfolding drama. By this time the German battleship had a heavy list to port, with the water reaching the upper deck. The port secondary battery turrets were almost submerged. Finally, the Bismarck capsized and sank at 1039 in the approximate position of 48º 10' North, 16º 12' West.

The Bismarck about to capsize sinking by the stern as seen from the cruiser Dorsetshire between 1036-1038 hours on 27 May.

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Almost two hours had elapsed since the battle had begun, and the Bismarck had shown a formidable capacity of resistance. The British first struck Bismarck at 0902, and ceased fire around 1016. For 74 minutes, the Bismarck received a continuous hammering that no other warship could have taken. We need not forget that the Hood sank six minutes after the first German shells were fired only three days earlier. Moreover, neither the main belt nor the armour deck seemed to have been penetrated during the combat², and in the end it was her own crew who scuttled the ship. During this last engagement 2,876 shells were fired at the Bismarck. They are itemised as follows:

380 of 40.6 cm from Rodney
339 of 35.6 cm from King George V
527 of 20.3 cm from Norfolk
254 of 20.3 cm from Dorsetshire
716 of 15.2 cm from Rodney
660 of 13.3 cm from King George V

It will never be known how many of them did actually hit (200, 300, maybe more?), but taking into account the short distances in the last phase of the action, it is assumed that many shells hit.
At 1100, only 20 minutes after the sinking, Winston Churchill informed the House of Commons gathered at Church House about the operations against Bismarck: "This morning shortly after day-break, the Bismarckvirtually immobilized, without help, was attacked by British battleships that pursued her. I don't know the result of this action. It seems however, that Bismarck was not sunk by gunfire, and now will be sunk by torpedoes. It is believed that this is happening right now. Great as is our loss in the Hood, the Bismarck must be regarded as the most powerful enemy battleship, as she is the newest enemy battleship and the striking of her from the German Navy is a very definite simplification of the task of maintaining effective mastery of the Northern sea and maintenance of the Northern blockade." Mr. Churchill had just sat down when he was given a note, the Prime Minister rose again and said: "I have just received news that the Bismarck is sunk." The cheers were loud and long.

Survivors.
Around 800 sailors managed to abandon the Bismarck before she sank. The rest of the crew, many of them still alive sank with the battleship. An hour later, the Dorsetshire picked up 86 sailors and the Maori another 25. The temperature of the water was 13º C. The British did not recover more men because they claimed there were U-boats in the area. Hours later, the U-74 (Lieutenant Eitel-Friedrich Kentrat) rescued three more sailors. They were Herbert Manthey, Otto Höntzsch, and Georg Herzog. The next day (28th), the German weather observation ship Sachsenwald (Lieutenant Wilhelm Schütte) found two more, Otto Maus and Walter Lorenzen. Meanwhile, the Spanish heavy cruiser Canarias (Captain Benigno González-Aller) had left the port of El Ferrol at 1140 on 27 May in an attempt to rescue some survivors from the Bismarck. On 30 May, after a brief meeting with the Sachsenwald the Canarias found two dead bodies floating in the sea which were pulled up aboard. These were Walter Gaszczak and Heinrich Neuschwander. At 1000 on the next day (31st), they were given a naval burial service and their bodies were committed to the deep. In the end, out of a crew of more than 2,200 officers, non-commissioned officers and men only 115 survived.

Ceremony aboard the Canarias for the Bismarck's dead.

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Following the sinking of the Bismarck, German aircraft had been sent to look for Admiral Tovey’s force that had run low on fuel and was on its way back home. On 28 May, the destroyers Tartar and Mashona were attacked by German bombers. Mashona was hit by a bomb on her port side and sank with the loss of 46 men. The Tartar rescued about 170 men, including Mashona’s commander William H. Selby. The rest of the British fleet arrived safely in port.
Operation Rheinübung: Final Observations.
Although considered a fine commander, Admiral Lütjens has been unjustly criticised for some of the decisions made during Operation Rheinübung. Today with the advantage of knowing the final outcome of battle, it is easy to conduct a deep examination of the operations and say what Lütjens should or shouldn't have done. But one must put oneself in the German Admiral’s place and try to understand the difficulties that affected his decisions and the time and circunmstances in which they were made. Nevertheless, the truth is that both German and British committed a series of "reproachable mistakes" that made this story even more dramatic and interesting. If a single one of those mistakes had not been made, the course of the operations could have developed in a completely different way and the outcome of the battle could have been quite different. As Karel Stepanek playing Admiral Lütjens in the 1960 movie "Sink the Bismarck" says: "We have a most interesting chess game here".
From the operative point of view, Operation Rheinübung was a failure since its first stages, since as early as 20 May, the German battle group had been already detected in the Kattegat. The British demonstrated that they had heavily improved their vigilance, and successfully signalled Bismarck's movements from her first arrival in Norwegian waters. The Germans, on the other hand, suffered from inadequate military intelligence and a lack of effective cooperation with the U-boat arm. Despite all this, the Bismarck almost escaped, and she would certainly have done so, if it were not for that fatal torpedo hit on the stern. If there is one thing that can not be reproached is the conduct of her crew which was in every way exemplary.
For the German Navy the sinking of the battleship Bismarck was probably the heaviest single blow of the war. Nevertheless, the Kriegsmarine still had considerable striking power and was far from being defeated as the year 1942 proved; however, but the loss of the Bismarck marked a turning point in the war on Allied merchant shipping. Not only because of the loss of the battleship itself, but because the consequences that it brought. Shortly after Operation Rheinübung, the Germans abandoned the use of heavy surface warships for raiding purposes in the Atlantic. From then on, only the auxiliary cruisers remained engaged against enemy merchant shipping, but even their use proved difficult by the end of 1941, and therefore the Germans concentrated their efforts in the U-boat war. U-boats would still bring important successes, but they, too, were eventually defeated in May 1943 with the loss of 41 units, in what it can be considered as the other turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic.
The aircraft carrier had revealed itself as a decisive weapon and soon was to replace the battleship as the ultimate warship. This was confirmed six months later during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, and during the Battle of the Coral Sea, the first true aero-naval battle in history between two carrier forces. Today, now in the 21st century, the battleship era is long gone, but the story of the Bismarck and her brave crew still fascinates thousands of people and her legend is still very much alive.

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Footnotes:
1. The MK VII torpedo weighted 1,409 kg (3,106 lbs) and had a warhead of 336 kg (740 lbs) TNT.

2. The most recent survey of Bismarck’s wreck showed only two complete penetrations in the lower 320 mm main belt, both on the starboard side. These penetrations must be credited to Rodney’s 40.6 cm guns since the King George V always kept herself onBismarck’s portside throughout the battle. 
source : http://www.kbismarck.com/

THE CHASE OF THE BISMARCK

By José M. Rico
Lütjens Options.

Bismarck astern of Prinz Eugen in the morning of 24 May after the Iceland Battle.

After the battle in the Denmark Strait, the German ships continued on a south-western course. At this time Lütjens had two main options. The first was to return to Norway and the second to carry on into the North Atlantic. Today most people agree that, if at all possible, Lütjens should have destroyed or at least disabled the already damaged Prince of Wales, then turn around, and head for Trondheim, via the Denmark Strait. Lütjens could also have taken a shorter path to Bergen, via the Faeroes-Iceland passage, although the chances of being intercepted by Tovey's battle group (King George V, Repulse, andVictorious) coming from Scapa Flow were greater as well. Instead, the German Admiral opted not to pursue the Prince of Wales (apparently against Captain Lindemann's suggestions) and headed for the Atlantic. At 0801, Admiral Lütjens sent a series of messages to the Group North informing it of his intention to take Bismarck to Saint-Nazaire for repairs. The Prinz Eugen, which was undamaged, would stay in the Atlantic to attack enemy convoys on her own.
The decision to head for Saint-Nazaire shows that after a survey of the damage sustained, Lütjens had correctly decided to cancel Operation Rheinübung at least temporarily until the Bismarck could be repaired in port. But, why did he choose Saint-Nazaire? The French port was farther than Norway and it required greater fuel expenditure. Lütjens probably thought France was the best place to resume the battle of the Atlantic as soon as possible following Raeder's wishes. In fact, he had successfully entered Brest withScharnhorst and Geneisenau a couple of months earlier.

At 0950, Captain Brinkmann was informed by semaphore of the damage received by Bismarck, and afterwards Lütjens ordered the Prinz Eugen to take up position aft of Bismarck temporarily in order to ascertain the severity of her oil loss. By 1100, the Prinz Eugen resumed her previous position in front of the battle group. The three British pursuing ships, now under command of Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, were still shadowing the Germans; the Suffolk from the starboard quarter, and the Norfolk with Prince of Wales from the port quarter. At noon, the German command transferred the operative control of Operation Rheinübungfrom Group North to Group West, and at 1240 Bismarck and Prinz Eugen set a new course of 180º due south at 24 knots.

  The Bismarck seen from the Prinz Eugen in the morning of 24 May during the last change of position. Dispositions made by the British Admiralty.
The unexpected sinking of the Hood caused enormous indignation in London, and the British Admiralty began to divert all available warships from their original missions in order to join in the chase for Bismarck. This included leaving most convoys that were at that time crossing the Atlantic unescorted.
The battleship Rodney (Captain Frederick H. G. Dalrymple-Hamilton) was at sea to the west of Ireland on her way to Boston for repairs with destroyers Somali, Tartar, Mashona, and Eskimo of the 6th Flotilla escorting the liner Britannic (27,759 tons), now used as a troop transport. The Admiralty ordered Rodney to operate against Bismarck and at 1036 on the 24th signalled: "If Britannic cannot keep up, leave her behind with 1 destroyer." Therefore Rodney and destroyers Tartar, Mashona and Somali left Britannic with destroyer Eskimo at noon. The battleship Ramillies (Captain Arthur D. Read) to the South of Cape Farewell was also instructed to leave the convoy she was escorting (HX-127) and "proceed so as to make contact with enemy from westwards, subsequently placing enemy between Ramillies and C.-in-C". In addition, the battleship Revenge (Captain Ernest R. Archer) in Halifax was ordered to put to sea, and she left port at 1500, then headed east.
The Prinz Eugen is Detached.
Early in the morning of 24 May, Admiral Lütjens had already decided to detach the Prinz Eugen, and at 1420 sent a semaphore signal to Captain Brinkmann:

«Intend to shake stalker as follows: During rain squall, the Bismarck will change course west. Prinz Eugen will maintain course and speed until he is forced to change position or three hours after the departure of Bismarck. Subsequently, is released to take on oil from "Belchen" or "Lothringen". Afterwards, pursue independent cruiser war. Implementation upon cue word, "Hood".»

This was to be a diversionary manoeuvre in which the Bismarck had to distract the British ships long enough to let the Prinz Eugen escape. Meanwhile, Vice-Admiral Karl Dönitz had ordered the U-boat force a complete cessation of operations against merchant shipping in order to support the Bismarck. At this time Lütjens urged Dönitz on a radio telegram to assemble his U-boats in quadrant AJ 68. His intention was thatBismarck would be able to lead the British pursuing ships into a trap the next day. Therefore Dönitz stationed several U-boats (U-93, U-43, U-46, U-557, U-66, U-94) in the given area to the South of the southern tip of Greenland. At 1540, the German battle group entered a rain squall, and the execution order of "Hood" was given. The Bismarck turned to starboard at 28 knots, however the Suffolk was shadowing very close from the starboard quarter and the manoeuvre failed. Therefore, at 1600 the Bismarck resumed her position on Prinz Eugen's wake. Two hours later, at 1814, the Bismarck turned to starboard at high speed again. This time the manoeuvre was successful and the Prinz Eugen maintained her course and left the formation. The Bismarck closed on the Suffolk, and at 1830 opened fire from 18,000 meters (19,685 yards), but the cruiser quickly retired under a smoke screen. Subsequently, the Bismarck became engaged with the Prince of Wales at long distance, and after an exchange of shells the fire ceased at 1856. After this action, in which no hits were scored by either side, the Suffolk joined the Norfolk and the Prince of Walesback to the port side of the Bismarck, probably to avoid being surprised by the German battleship if she decided to reverse her course again. This left Bismarck’s starboard side open. The British would pay a high price for this manoeuvre a few hours later, but before this they would still have an opportunity to attack theBismarck.
The fuel situation aboard Bismarck had become serious, and at 2056, Lütjens informed Group West that, due to fuel shortage, he was to proceed directly to Saint-Nazaire. In fact, at this time the Bismarck had less than 3,000 tons of fuel-oil available, and unless some of the 1,000 tons of fuel blocked under the forecastle could be retrieved, the battleship would be forced to slow down in order to reach the French coast. HadBismarck been refuelled in Bergen on 21 May, now she would have some 1,000 tons more of additional fuel available. That would have given Bismarck more freedom of movement and would have enabled Lütjens to make a diversionary manoeuvre to try shake off his pursuers. But the reality was that the fuel shortage hampered the original idea to drive the pursuing British forces into the western U-boat screen, and it forcedBismarck to follow a steady course to France. As a result of this change of plans, all available U-boats in the Bay of Biscay were now ordered to form a patrol line to cover Bismarck's new expected course.
Attacked by Swordfish Torpedo Planes.

Victorious' Swordfish shortly before the attack on Bismarck in the afternoon of 24 May 1941.

At 1509, Admiral Tovey had detached Rear-Admiral Alban Curteis (in Galatea) with the carrier Victorious(Captain Henry Cecil Bovell) and the four light cruisers Galatea, Aurora, Kenya and Hermione to close the range and deliver a torpedo attack. At 2210, some 120 miles from Bismarck, Victorious launched all her nine Swordfish torpedo planes of the 825th Squadron under the command of Lieutenant-Commander (A) Eugene Esmonde.¹ At 2300, they were followed by three Fulmars of the 800Z Squadron, and at 0100 by two more to maintain touch. Esmonde obtained a surface contact on his ASV (Air-to-Surface Vessel) radar at 2350, and prepared his aircraft for the attack, but instead ofBismarck he found the US Coast Guard Cutter Modoc(Lieutenant-Commander Harold Belford). The Bismarck, only six miles away, spotted the British aircraft and opened fire immediately while increasing the speed to 27 knots.
One Swordfish lost contact with the rest of the squadron in a cloud layer, and only eight planes proceeded to attack around midnight. The German anti-aircraft fire was very intense and even the main and secondary batteries opened fire. Lindemann and the helmsman, Hans Hansen, operating the press buttons of the steering gear, successfully avoided the first six torpedoes when suddenly the battleship was hit. A 18 inch MK XII torpedo struck Bismarck's starboard side, amidships, at the level of the main belt which resisted the explosion very well. The damage was minimal, although the explosion caused the death of OberbootsmannKurt Kirchberg (who became the first casualty aboard) and injured six men.

The Bismarck as photographed by one of 825 Squadron’s Swordfish, 24 May 1941.

Despite the heavy anti-aircraft fire none of the obsolete Swordfish were shot down, and by 0230, all of them had landed on theVictorious. However, the last two Fulmars that had been launched from Victorious were not so fortunate, and they were lost after they ran out of fuel and were forced to land in the sea. The crew of one of them was rescued later by the merchant ship Beaverhill.
After the Swordfish attack, the Bismarck reduced her speed to 16 knots to alleviate the pressure in the forecastle and carry out repairs. The distance between both forces decreased, and at 0131 on 25 May (Lütjens' 52th birthday), the Prince of Walesopened fire on Bismarck. The battleships exchanged two salvoes each at a range of 15,000 meters (16,400 yards), but due to the poor visibility neither side scored any hits. The morale aboard the Bismarckwas high and sometime about then, the crew wished the Chief of Fleet a happy birthday by the ship's loudspeaker system.
Admiral Lütjens Makes His Move.
All three British ships that were shadowing the Bismarck from the port quarter had begun to zig-zag in case of a possible U-boat attack. At 0306, taking advantage of the enemy’s disposition and the darkness, Lütjens saw his opportunity to break the contact with his pursuers. The Bismarck increased her speed to 27 knots and turned to starboard, in a manoeuvre very similar to the one executed the previous afternoon when thePrinz Eugen was detached. The Bismarck succeeded in breaking contact and established a new course of 130º due southeast, to Saint-Nazaire. The British ships tried in vain to re-establish contact with theBismarck, and at 0401 the Suffolk reported: "Enemy contact lost."
Vice-Admiral Wake Walker's order to change the position of Suffolk in the previous afternoon (24 May) now had its consequences. It gave the Bismarckroom to manoeuvre, and Lütjens did not waste this opportunity. With the Suffolk stationed on Bismarck's starboard quarter, it would have been much more difficult for the German battleship to break contact.
Nevertheless, on board the Bismarck they did not realize that the contact had been broken, and at 0700 Admiral Lütjens sent the following message to the Group West: "One battleship, two heavy cruisers keeping contact." At 0900, Lütjens sent another long message to the Group West. Neither message reached Group West until well after 0900. Ironically, Group West had previously sent (at 0846) a message confirming that the British had lost contact. After this,Bismarck kept strict radio silence, but the British had already intercepted her signals allowing them to calculate her approximate position.
At 1152, Lütjens received a personal message from Admiral Raeder: "Heartiest Birthday Wishes! In view of your recent great armed feat, may you be granted many more such successes [as you enter] a new year of your life!" Minutes later, at noon, Lütjens delivered the following speech to the crew by the loudspeakers:

"Soldiers of the battleship Bismarck! You have achieved great fame! The sinking of the battlecruiser Hood does not only have a military, but also a morale [psychological] value [significance], because Hood was England’s pride. The enemy will now attempt to gather its forces and deploy them toward us. Therefore, I released Prinz Eugen yesterday noon so that he can conduct his own war on merchant vessels. He has accomplished to evade the enemy. By contrast, because of the hits we have sustained, we have received the order to head for a French harbour. The enemy will gather on the way and will engage us in battle. The German Nation is with you [in spirit] and we will fire until the barrels glow and until the last projectile has exited the barrel. For us soldiers [the battle cry] as of now is: “Victory or death!”

At 1625, Lütjens received yet another message of congratulations, this time from Hitler: “I send to you today my very best congratulation for your Birthday!" That same afternoon, Bismarck's Chief Engineer, Lieutenant-Commander Walter Lehmann and several crewmen began to construct a dummy funnel. This would give the battleship two funnels and hopefully confuse the enemy, should Bismarck be detected again. During the night of 25/26 May, the Bismarck maintained her course and there were no incidents on board.
The Bismarck is Located.
In the morning of 26 May, as the Bismarck was approaching the French coast, the crew was ordered to repaint the top of the main and secondary turrets yellow. Hard job considering the state of the seas, nevertheless it was carried out although the yellow paint washed off at least once.
A few hours earlier, at 0300, two Coastal Command Catalina flying boats had taken off from Lough Erne in Northern Ireland on a reconnaissance mission in search for the Bismarck. At about 1010, Catalina Z of 209 Squadron commanded by Dennis Briggs sighted the German battleship that immediately answered with very accurate anti-aircraft fire.² The Catalina jettisoned her four depth charges and took evasive action after her hull was holed by shrapnel. Then reported: "One battleship, bearing 240º, distance 5 miles, course 150º. My position 49º 33' North, 21º 47' West. Time of transmission 1030/26." After more than 31 hours since the contact was broken, the Bismarck had been located again. Unfortunately for the British, however, Admiral Tovey's ships were too far away from the German battleship. The King George V was 135 miles to the north, and the Rodney (with a top speed of 21 knots) was 125 miles to the northeast. They would never catch up with the Bismarck unless her speed could be seriously reduced.
Only the Force H, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir James F. Somerville, sailing from Gibraltar, had a chance to intercept Bismarck. The battlecruiser Renown (Captain Rhoderick R. McGriggor) was in the best position, but having lost the Hood only two days earlier, the Admiralty did not permit Renown to engage theBismarck. The best hope for the British was to launch an air strike from the carrier Ark Royal. The Ark Royal had already launched 10 Swordfish at 0835 to try find the Bismarck, and once the report of the Catalina sighting arrived, the two closest Swordfish altered course to intercept. At 1114, Swordfish 2H located the German battleship too, followed seven minutes later by the 2F. Shortly afterwards two more Swordfish, fitted with long-range tanks, were launched to relieve 2H and 2F and keep touch with Bismarck.
At 1450, fifteen Swordfish commanded by Lieutenant-Commander J. A. Stewart-Moore took off from the Ark Royal (Captain Loben E. Maund) to attack the Bismarck. At 1550, they obtained radar contact with a ship and dived to attack. The attack, however, turned out to be a failure since the ship sighted was actually the light cruiser Sheffield (Captain Charles A. Larcom) which had been detached from Force H to make contact with the Bismarck. Luckily for the British, the Sheffield was not hit by any of the 11 torpedoes launched because they had faulty magnetic pistols. Two torpedoes exploded upon hitting the water, three on crossing the cruiser wake, and the other six were successfully avoided. The Swordfish returned to the Ark Royalwhere they landed after 1700, but not without trouble because of the terrible weather conditions. The rise and fall of the stern was measured to be 56 feet, and three aircraft smashed their undercarriages against the flight deck. Shortly afterwards, at 1740, the Sheffield obtained visual contact with the Bismarck.
The British put every effort on one last attack. It would be dark soon, and they knew this was their last real chance to stop or at least slow down the Bismarck. If they failed again, the Bismarck would reach the French coast on the next day, since another air strike late at night was unlikely to succeed. Therefore, at 1915, another group comprised of fifteen Swordfish, mostly the same used in the previous attack, took off from the Ark Royal, and this time their torpedoes were armed with contact pistols.
Meanwhile, the pursuing British forces had run acrossU-556 (Lieutenant Herbert Wohlfarth) which sighted the Renown and the Ark Royal at 1948. The German submarine was perfectly placed for an attack, but could not do so as it had no torpedoes left. Wohlfarth had spent his last “fishes” on the ships of convoy HX-126 a few days back. Therefore, U-556 could only make signals reporting the position, course and speed of the enemy.
The Swordfish striking force, this time under the command of Lieutenant-Commander T.P. Coode, first approached the Sheffield to get the range and bearing to the Bismarck, and at 2047, began the attack.Bismarck's anti-aircraft battery opened fire immediately. During the course of the attack, theBismarck received at least two torpedo hits. One torpedo (or two) hit the port side amidships, and another struck the stern in the starboard side. The first hit did not cause important damage, but the second jammed both rudders at 12º to port. The Bismarck made a circle and then began to steer northwest involuntarily into the wind. As before, none of the Swordfish were shot down although some were hit several times. The damage to the Bismarck was so serious that at 2140, Admiral Lütjens sent the following message to Group West: "Ship unable to manoeuvre. We will fight to the last shell. Long live the Führer".
The impact in the stern area caused the flooding of the steering and other adjacent compartments. This meant that all repair attempts would have to be done under water. Divers were ordered to enter the steering compartment in order to free the rudders, but the violent movement of the water inside made this an impossible task. It was not possible to lower divers over the side due to the high seas. As an alternative, it was considered to blow the rudders away with explosives and try to steer the ship using the propellers alone, but the idea was rejected fearing that the explosion could damage the propellers.


Destroyers Attack Bismarck.
After the aerial torpedo attack, the new erratic course of the Bismarck caused her to close the range with the Sheffield. At about 2145, Bismarck opened fire on the Sheffield at a range of about nine miles.Bismarck fired a total of six salvoes and the British cruiser turned away to the north under the cover of a smoke screen. The Sheffield was not hit, but some splinters disabled her radar and injured twelve men of whom three died later.³ The turn caused Sheffield to lose contact with Bismarck, but at 2200, she made contact with the destroyers of the 4th Flotilla (Captain Philip L. Vian) Cossack, Maori, Zulu, Sikh andPiorun, and provided them with the approximate bearing and distance to the German battleship.
At 2238, the Polish destroyer Piorun (Commander Eugeniusz Plawski) sighted the Bismarck. The German battleship responded shortly thereafter with three salvoes. The destroyers proceeded to attack, butBismarck defended herself vigorously in the dark. At 2342, splinters knocked down Cossack's antennas. Shortly after 0000, star shells from the destroyers began to illuminate the area. About an hour later, a star shell fell on Bismarck's bows starting a fire there that had to be extinguished by some crew members. Throughout the night the destroyers attacked the German battleship. These attacks were carried out in heavy seas, rain squalls and low visibility, and no torpedo hits were obtained on Bismarck, that time after time repelled every attack with heavy and accurate fire from her main and secondary batteries. By 0700, a total of 16 torpedoes had been fired by the destroyers of the 4th Flotilla.

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Footnotes:
1. Lieutenant-Commander (A) Eugene Esmonde died on 12 February 1942 when his Swordfish was shot down while attacking the German ships crossing the English Channel. For this action he was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.
2. Dennis Briggs was not at the controls of Catalina Z/209 at the time. The man who actually sighted the Bismarck was the American US Navy Ensign Leonard “Tuck” Smith. The British only credited Briggs because he was the aircraft commander and didn’t want it known that Americans were involved since they were still considered neutrals.

3. On board Sheffield, Ordinary Seaman David T. George died on 26 May 1941, Able Seaman Ambrose Ling died on 27 May 1941, and Able Seaman Raymond C. Taylor died on 28 May 1941. The destroyers of the 4th Flotilla had the following casualties: Leading Stoker Ernest R. Potter aboard Sikh died on 26 May 1941, Petty Officer John Palmer aboard Maori died on 31 May 1941, and Leading Seaman William F. Dawe aboard Zulu died on 2 June 1941.


source : http://www.kbismarck.com/